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"The fight againstdrug trafficking is a pretext for the [United
States] to dominate Latin America-for the [United States] to
dominate ourpeople, to violate our sovereignty. "I
- PresidentEvo Morales

I. INTRODUCTION
Leonida Zurita-Vargas is a Quechua2 woman who used to grow
3
coca in the Chapare region of Bolivia's Cochabamba department.
She is among the millions of cocaleros4 who have been unhappy that
the United States wants Bolivia to drastically reduce coca cultivation
5
as part of the U.S. War on Drugs.
[B]ecause of the American drug problem, we can no longer grow
coca, which was part of our life and our culture long before the
United States was a country. This is why many of the people

1. James Reynolds, Bolivia Wages War on the Coca Leaf, BBC NEWS, June 6,
2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid778000/778100.stm.
This quote is characteristic of the fiery rhetoric used by Bolivia's newly elected
president to inspire his indigenous base to oppose U.S. intervention in Bolivia. See
id.
2. Quechua people are the indigenous inhabitants of the Andes who speak one
of several variations of the native language, Quechua. THE OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 1226 (2d. ed. 2003).
3. The Chapare is a tropical region of Bolivia, east of the highest ridges of the
Andes Mountains, near the city of Cochabamba. HARRY SANABRIA, THE COCA
BOOM AND RURAL SOCIAL CHANGE IN BOLIVIA 28-29 (1993). Lower in elevation,
and with a less harsh climate than other areas, the Chapare region is well-suited for
growing coca for cocaine cultivation, and in recent years a majority of illicit coca
farming has taken place in the Chapare.HERBERT S. KLEIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
BOLIVIA 246-47 (2003).
4. Coca growers and those who support the right to grow the plant in Bolivia,
are known as cocaleros. Madeline Barbara Lons & Harry Sanabria, Coca and
Cocaine in Bolivia: Reality and Political Illusion, in COCA, COCAINE, AND THE
BOLIVIAN REALITY 8 (Madeline Barbara Lons & Harry Sanabria eds., 1997). In
this Article, coca growers, coca union members, and members of the Movement
Towards Socialism (MAS) political party will be referred to interchangeably as
cocaleros.
5. The "War on Drugs," a phrase first used by President Richard Nixon, will be
discussed in Part III, infra.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009
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protesting in La Paz and other cities are peasants whose families
have cultivated coca for generations.
My tribe, the Quechua, comes from the lowland jungles of the
Chapare in central Bolivia. We are used to chewing coca leaves
every day, much as Americans drink coffee. We sustained
ourselves by growing coca for chewing ....
We did not turn coca
into cocaine; the chemicals needed for that are made in countries
like the United States. Bolivia now allows us to grow a very small
amount of coca, but it is not enough.
I am a cocalera. I owe my life to coca. My father died when I
was [two years old] and my mother raised six children by growing
coca. I was a farmer myself, growing coca for traditional purposes.
But the United States says it is better for us to just forget about
coca ....

•.. The war on the cocaleros has brought Bolivia nothing but
poverty and death.6

The coca leaf, native to South America, is the raw material for the
production of cocaine, perhaps the most insidious drug confronting the
United States today.7 But to many indigenous Andeans like ZuritaVargas, coca is not a drug but a sacred plant that has been an integral
part of their culture for hundreds of years. Thus when the United
States began promoting anti-narcotics laws in Bolivia and providing
funds, training, and technical assistance for the eradication of their
sacred plant over two decades ago, indigenous Bolivians reacted
angrily. Many Bolivians do not understand that the United States is
waging war against cocaine and its deadly effects, not against coca or
against traditional Andean culture itself.
Andean opposition to anti-drug laws and U.S. intervention has
sparked a powerful social movement, enflamed by the pro-coca
6. Leonida Zurita-Vargas, Coca Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2003, at A19.
Columnist John Tierney, also writing for the New York Times, sardonically echoes
Zurita-Vargas' criticism: "[t]he Saudis can fight alcoholism by forbidding the sale of
Jack Daniels, but we'd think they were crazy if they ordered us to eradicate fields of
barley in Tennessee." John Tierney, Reading the Coca Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2006, at All.
7. BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: POLICY AND

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS 3 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/ 18 166.pdf.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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socialist Evo Morales. Morales, himself a dark-skinned indigenous
coca farmer who is deeply distrustful of globalization and foreign
intervention in Bolivia, was elected president in 2005 after promising
8
to rid Bolivia of what he calls "North American imperialism."
Morales came to power by successfully combining Bolivians'
opposition to the War on Drugs with the traditional anti-globalization
movements in Bolivia. Since his election, Morales has loosened
restrictions on coca growth, nationalized Bolivia's gas industry,
ousted many foreign investors, and swept the desperately poor country
towards socialism and the autocratic ideology of Castro's Cuba and
9
Chavez's Venezuela.
There have been few, if any, connections made between U.S. drug
policy and the rise of Morales and his socialist political party. And
fewer, if any, studies of U.S. drug policy adequately account for the
historical importance of the coca plant among many Andean people.
By first describing in depth the sacredness of coca in the Andes,
this Article will explain how U.S. drug policies in South America and
Bolivian anti-drug laws promoted and enforced by the United States
have been a direct cause of the revolution that has brought Morales'
brand of socialism to Bolivia. More broadly, this Article will explain
why the unintended and unwanted consequences of U.S. action in
Bolivia should guide future foreign intervention. Part I will discuss
the history and sacredness of coca in the Andes, an understanding of
which is essential to appreciate Bolivians' passionate opposition to
anti-drug laws. Part III will describe the U.S. drug war and its supplyreduction component as well as the anti-coca laws passed by the
Bolivian congress. Part IV will explain how U.S. pressure and
financial support for coca eradication and anti-narcotics laws have
proven to be the impetus for the major social movement led by Evo

8. Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, "Coca is Everything Here": Hard Truths About
Bolivia's Drug War, 22 WORLD POL'Y J. 103, 105 (2005).

9. Bolivia Gas Under State Control, BBC NEWS, May 2, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4963348.stm (describing Morales' six-month
deadline requiring "foreign energy firms [to] agree to channel all their sales through
the Bolivian state, or else leave the country."); see also Country Profile: Bolivia,
BBC NEWS, Jan. 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country-profiles/
1210487.stm (describing Morales' nationalization and wealth redistribution efforts
as well as his admiration for Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez).
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009
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Morales. Part V will discuss the implications of the first two years of
Morales' presidency.
The consequences of what Bolivians view as U.S. "meddling" and
"imperialism" have been great. Evo Morales has been able to use antiU.S. sentiment and the economic plight of coca farmers like Leonida
Zurita-Vargas and other members of Bolivia's poor, indigenous
majority to build a powerful political movement fueled by nationalism
and poverty-and he has used this movement to make himself
president. The overall goal of this Article is to explain why the United
States, through its support for anti-coca laws in Bolivia, has frustrated
its own broad goals for the region: a stable, democratic, and
economically successful Bolivia that maintains a market economy and
sets an example for Latin America.
II. COCA AND BOLIVIA

One cannot understand the current political dynamics in
Bolivia without understanding coca's historical role in Andean
society. Coca has historically been used as a chew, in tea, as a
medicine, and has been integral to the economies of mountain
communities, with many families relying on the crop for centuries
for their livelihoods. More importantly, coca possesses a spiritual,
even divine, 10 place in the culture of many Andean communities.
Thus, its regulation is not analogous to the prohibition of many
drugs in the United States, such as marijuana or cocaine."
This section will begin by describing Bolivia generally,
including its political history, demographics, and economy, and
will conclude by describing in depth the important role that the
coca plant plays in Bolivian society.
A. An Overview of Bolivian Culture and History
Bolivia possesses several characteristics that make the nation

ripe for a socialist revolution. Two important factors are poverty
and indigenous culture, both of which Bolivia has in abundance.
10. See, e.g., W. GOLDEN MORTIMER, PERU: HISTORY OF COCA, "THE DIVINE

PLANT OF THE INCAS" (J.H Vail & Co., 1901).
11. One could probably not argue, for example, that the regulation of
marijuana offends the cultural identity of U.S. citizens.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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Bolivia, by every measure the poorest nation in South America,
possesses the continent's largest percentage of indigenous
people, 13 many of whom cherish the "divine" coca plant.

1. A Troubled History
Since its independence from Spanish rule in 1825, the Andean
nation has seen almost 200 attempted political coups, a series of
corrupt governments, the rise and decline of major mining
industries, and the contemporary problems arising from the drug
trade.1 4 Although rich in natural resources, Bolivia has a per
capita income of just over $1000 annually, making it the poorest
nation in South America. 15 In recent years, the government of
Bolivia has struggled to increase foreign investment in the
country, improve the national educational system, provide better
infrastructure for its people, and prevent further corruption within
its democratic institutions. 16 Perhaps the nation's most pressing
concern in recent years, however, has been trying to halt its coca
and cocaine production while at the same time finding work for
the poorest citizens.
2. The East-West Divide
The economic divide between the rich and poor in Bolivia is
also a divide along geographic, cultural, and ethnic lines; class is
inextricably linked with geography and skin color. While the
poorest Bolivians live mostly in the mountainous west, those
living in Bolivia's eastern region, with its fertile soil, are much

12. See Country Profile: Bolivia, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: BOLIVIA (2008),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
at
available
geos/bl.html [hereinafter CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: BOLIVIA].
15. Country Profile: Bolivia, supra note 9 (stating that Bolivia's gross national
income per capita is U.S. $1260).
16. Id.; Daniel Tyler Cook, Note, The Case for Coca and Cocaine: Bolivia's
March to Economic Freedom, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 57, 71 (2003); see also
BENJAMIN DANGL, THE PRICE OF FIRE: RESOURCE WARS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
IN BOLIVIA214, 217-19 (2007).
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wealthier.1 7 Westerners are generally darker-skinned Indians, in
contrast to the lighter skinned mestizo' 8 citizens of the eastern
departments. Almost two-thirds of Bolivia's indigenous
population lives below the poverty line.' 9 Through much of its
history, Bolivia has been governed by the mestizo elite,
descendants of the Spanish who conquered the region in the
sixteenth century. 20 Indigenous Bolivians have worked on feudal
estates, in tin or silver mines, or on small subsistence farms for
their lighter-skinned Spanish masters for centuries. 21 The
separation of indigenous and white citizens is still evident today
and contributes to much of the current social tension in the
country. 22
This cultural and ethnic conflict is particularly evident in the
wealthy Santa Cruz region. The eastern department of Santa Cruz is
Bolivia's largest and richest, possessing the country's most valuable
natural resources, including natural gas and Bolivia's most fertile
agricultural land. 23 The mestizo residents of Santa Cruz, Crucefios, as
they are called, oppose the plans of President Morales to use increased
tax revenues from their region to fund social programs for western
Indians.24 As a result, there is a rising demand for regional autonomy

17.

Country Profile:Bolivia, supra note 9.

18. Mestizos are persons of mixed European and Amerindian ancestry. THE
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 940 (2d ed. 2003). In this Article,

the terms mestizo and white will be used to describe non-indigenous Andeans.
19. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: BOLIVIA, supra note 14.

20. Stephen Johnson, Heritage Found., Bolivia Needs Consensus and Property
Rights,
Not
Elections,
WebMemo
No.
775
(June
27,
2005),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm775.cfm?renderforprint=1.
21. Id.
22. Id. ("Much of the turmoil in Bolivia stems from discord between citizens
of European descent and the country's majority . . . indigenous poor. Spanish

descendants have typically received land grants and access to political power from
crony governments while natives lived apart, mostly uneducated, and were forced to
work in silver and tin mines as well as subsistence agriculture.")
23.

Bolivia Regions Declare Autonomy,

BBC NEws,

Dec.

15,

2007,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7144447.stm.
24. See

Revolution

Postponed,

ECONOMIST,

Nov.

10,

2007,

http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaystory.cfm?story-id= 1010
4935 ("Although the mountainous and mainly-Indian west is solidly behind Mr.
Morales, the commercially-minded, whiter lowland east is bitterly opposed to
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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from residents of Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz politicians and community
leaders believe that because the department's bustling industry
provides one-third of Bolivia's total economy, 25 more of that money
should stay in Santa Cruz, instead of being used in the "backward"
26
mountain provinces.
Autonomy for the region has wide popular support in Santa Cruz,
and there is a growing, sometimes violent, separatist group that
receives funding from some Cruceiios and the Santa Cruz Chamber of
Commerce. 27 The rift between the indigenous Andeans of Bolivia's
western mountainous region and the wealthy mestizos of Santa Cruz
has only been exacerbated by Morales' presidency. 28 Further political
instability and violence, even civil war, are possible if President
Morales continues his plans to use tax revenue from Santa Cruz to
fund social programs in the country's western regions.
3. NaturalResources and Drugs
Paradoxically, Bolivia, with a very poor population, is rich in
natural resources. For centuries, Bolivia's tin and silver mines and its
natural gas reserves have produced consistent profits-but usually for
foreign companies or mestizo elites, and never for poor citizens.2 9
him.").
25. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, With Bolivia Still Seized by Unrest and
Instability, There Are Lessons to Be Learned About Autonomy From Nicaragua's
Comparative Experience, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.coha.org/2005/08/withbolivia-still-seized-by-unrest-and-instability-there-are-lessons-to-be-leamed-aboutautonomy-from-nicaragua%E2%80%99s-comparative-experience/.
26. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Bolivia's Strife Intensifies: The Autonomy
Being Sought by Santa Cruz Departmental Leaders Threatens Political Stability,
Feb. 11, 2005, http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/bolivia/2843.html
("Santa Cruz autonomy boosters contend that the La Paz-based central government
has squandered revenues collected from their residents to pay for costly, but poorly
administered, public services in the country's purportedly more backward western
highland region.").
27. Id.
28. Morales is disliked in Santa Cruz because of his proposals to use more tax
revenue from the region to support social programs for poor Indians. For example,
Morales cannot walk through the airport in Santa Cruz without eliciting racist shouts
such as "go away Indian," and "don't come to Santa Cruz; you don't belong here."
See COCALERO (Fall Line Films 2007).
29. See Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 8, at 105 (describing the "impoverished
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009
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Bolivia's economy has been export-based, with major eastern
exports such as silver, tin, soy products, oil, and gas-and now
coca and cocaine-accounting for most of the capital in the
country. 30 Because the economy has been structured around the
export of a few major products, it has been highly sensitive to
fluctuations in the global price and demand for the goods it
produces. This is evidenced by the economic collapse in the early
1970s when the international price of tin plummeted.3 1 By 1981,
most of its tin mines were closed, and Bolivia's GNP dropped
twenty-five percent between 1981 and 1986, while both rural and
urban unemployment increased.32
The decline of the mining industry in the 1980s left many
indigenous people out of work and created a vacuum that would
eventually be filled by coca and cocaine production, commodities33
that were in high demand and generated consistent profits.
Bolivian workers found that while the industrialized world no
longer wanted a great deal of tin, it still demanded South
American drugs.34 Through the early 1980s, there was a great
migration of peasants from the high Andes to the tropical forests
of central Bolivia, where most of the illicit coca is grown, and the
number of coca farms increased tenfold.35 As a result, coca and
cocaine became the country's most profitable exports in the wake
of the collapse of the tin market.
B. The History of Coca Use and Cultivation
It is unknown when Andeans first began growing coca, but its
use predates Columbus' discovery of the New World.36 Modern
archaeology suggests that descendants of nomadic Siberian people
highland existence" of the ancestors of coca growers prior to migrating to the
jungle).
30. Lons & Sanabria, supra note 4, at 1-3.
31. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 8, at 105.
32. See L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 4, at 1, 14.
33. SANABRA, supra note 3, at 1-2.
34. See Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 8, at 105.
35. Id.
36. See L6ons & Sanabria, supra note 4, at 3-4; Robert B. South, Coca in
Bolivia, 67 GEOGRAPHICAL REv. 22, 22 (1972).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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may have established communities in the Andes Mountains as
early as 10,000 B.C.E. 3 7 Aymara-speaking tribes migrated to the
Bolivian altiplano3 8 around 700 B.C.E, and sometime after 700
39
B.C.E, Andean people began growing coca in the altiplano.
Before the Spanish conquest, Indians of eastern Bolivia grew coca
40
for tea, chewing, and ritual use.
By the mid-sixteenth century, the Spanish began enslaving
Indians to operate massive coca plantations and silver and tin
mines. 4 1 The Spanish sold the coca yield to native people, and
after recognizing its positive effects on mobilizing labor, coca was
even used by the Spanish as a stimulant to energize workers in the
42
largest Bolivian tin and silver mines of Potosi and Huancavelica.
The Spanish also provided their slaves with coca to supply them
with some vitamins and to avoid giving them other costlier
vegetables. 4 3 As a result of Spanish colonial rule, "[d]uring the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, coca production [in the
Andes] increased forty- to fifty-fold . . . [and] thousands of
[indigenous Andeans lived and] died cultivating a crop destined
44
for sale to their own people.",

37. WALTRAUD Q. MORALES, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BOLIVIA 2 (2003).

38. The Bolivian altiplano is a high country plateau of eastern Bolivia that
covers about ten percent of the country. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 3-4.
39. MORALES, supra note 37, at 3.
40. CATHERINE J. ALLEN, THE HOLD LIFE HAS: COCA AND CULTURAL
IDENTITY IN AN ANDEAN COMMUNITY 188-89 (2d ed. 2002).

41. Bolivia: Legacy of Coca, Andean Information Network, June 9, 2004,
http://ain-bolivia.org/index2.php?option=com-content&do-pdf= 1&id=61.
42. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 40, at 189-90 (describing coca's use to drive
the pace of silver mining and its effects as being "conducive to work and
concentration while relieving fatigue and dulling sensations of hunger and thirst");
see also Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 8, at 105 (stating that the Spanish began paying
workers in coca after realizing how effective it was at staving off hunger, fatigue,
and altitude sickness.). n addition, the Spanish discovered that miners could work
longer and had an increased tolerance for physical labor when allowed to consume
coca. Bolivia: Legacy of Coca, supra note 41.
43. See ALLEN, supra note 40, at 190 (discussing the scarcity of green
vegetables and need for the vitamins and minerals in coca leaves).
44. Id. at 189. "Paradoxically, it was out of this historical situation-the
colonial holocaust of disease, taxation, forced labor, and forced religious
conversion-that the cultural identity of the [indigenous coca growers] took shape,
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009
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1. Uses
Coca has traditionally been used in one of two ways: either as
a chew or in coca tea.45 Coca leaves contain many nutrients,
including vitamins A and B, phosphorus, and iron. 4 6 In high-altitude
communities where green vegetables are scarce, the extra nutrients
provided by coca leaves are often much needed.47 Coca is also widely
used to diminish the effects of the decreased oxygen at high altitudes,
as any visitor to an Andean city will discover.48 Much like coffee,
coca is a mild stimulant and is the social drink of choice for many.
Coca is also believed to be a panacea for numerous ailments and is
even used as an aphrodisiac. 49
2. Coca's CulturalSignificance
Although coca is widely used-and relied upon-as a
functional medicine and a mild stimulant, its importance to
traditional religion and indigenous culture is what makes coca
regulation and eradication such a volatile issue in Bolivia. The
coca plant is more than a medicine or stimulant for Bolivians-it
is a defining characteristic and symbol of traditional Andean life.
To many Bolivians, coca is a sacred plant essential to their
spiritual lives and self-identity as a people.

and that coca use came to signify Indianness." Id.
45. DANGL, supra note 16, at 37.
46. SANABRIA, supra note 3, at 37-38; ALLEN, supra note 40, at 190.
47. ALLEN, supra note 40, at 190; SANABRIA, supra note 3, at 37-38. In the

high Andes, where potatoes are the main food source, the vitamins from coca are
especially beneficial and some have suggested that coca leaves help to regulate the
excess glucose that results from consuming too many carbohydrates. See ALLEN,
supra note 40, at 190.
48. ALLEN, supra note 40, at 190. A visitor to any small town or village, or

even a large modem city like Cuzco, Peru (at 11,000 feet above sea level), or La
Paz, Bolivia (12,000 feet), will routinely be offered coca tea to mitigate altitude
sickness. See id.

49. South, supra note 36, at 23. The effect of drinking a cup of coca tea has
been compared to that of drinking a cup of coffee and swallowing a single aspirin
tablet. ALLEN, supra note 40, at 190; see also Madeline Barbara Lons, Risk and
Opportunity in the Coca/Cocaine Industry in the Bolivian Yungas, 25 J. LATIN AM.
STUD. 121, 123 (1993).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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a. The "Divine Plant"
There is a legend among the Quechuas that coca chewing and
its healing power, was first discovered by Santfsima Marfa-a
saint, "Our Mother," to the Quechuas-after her child was lost in
the wilderness. 50 Grieving and wandering through the mountains,
Santfsima Marfa picked a handful of coca leaves and began to
51
chew, immediately learning that the leaves soothed her spirits.
For indigenous Andeans, the legend symbolizes the long history
of coca use for easing the pain of life's hardships.
The first major study of the coca plant and the history of its use
was undertaken in 1901 by W. Golden Mortimer, a medical doctor.
His book, A History of Coca: The Divine Plant of the Incas, focuses
on the use of the coca plant in the small mountain communities of
Peru and western Bolivia. Indigenous Andeans, Mortimer found,
revered coca and viewed the plant as divine, believing it to possess
religious power and significance:
The absolute reliance of the Andean Indians upon Coca not only for
sustenance, but as a general panacea for all ills, has naturally led
them to feel a superstitious regard for the plant. This reverence has
descended to them from the Incan period, during which the shrub
was looked upon as "a living manifestation of divinity, and the

places of its growth a sanctuary where all mortals should bend a
52
knee."
Mortimer found that Andeans believe that "if a dying man can
3
appreciate the taste of coca leaves ... his soul will enter Paradise.-1
The coca plant has been more than a vegetable or a stimulant for
native Andeans; instead, it has been an integral and sacred part of
everyday life.

50. ALLEN, supra note 40, at 7.
51. Id.
52. MORTIMER, supra note 10, at 19-20.
53. Id. at 73.
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b. To Be a "Real Person"
Mortimer's study was conducted in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century Andean communities, but his findings are consistent
with more recent studies. Catherine Allen, a sociologist specializing in
indigenous Andean culture, wrote The Hold Life Has: Coca and
Cultural Identity in an Andean Community, after living and studying
in a Quechua society. 54 Like Mortimer, she also found that the coca
plant has for centuries been inextricably linked to the self-identity and
religion of the Andean people. While living with Quechua-speaking
peasants in Peru, Allen discovered that the coca plant "carries a way
of life with it. To [chew coca] properly ... is to be a Runa, a 'real
person.' To chew coca leaves is to affirm the attitudes and values-the
habits of mind and body-that are characteristic of indigenous
55
Andean culture."
56
Coca leaves are also incorporated in traditional prayers, funerals,
and marriage ceremonies,5 7 and their use is believed to ward off and
cure numerous ailments and illnesses, including altitude sickness,
hunger, and common aches and pains. 58 Often, ground coca leaves are
blown or scattered over food before it is eaten in order to share the
food with the gods. 59 The leaves have material value as well, and in

54. ALLEN, supra note 40, at 8.

55. Id. at 7-8.
56. Id. Allen describes attending an indigenous funeral where "k'intus (small
offerings of coca leaves) [were shared] with Mother Earth, the Sacred Places around
us, and the souls of the ancestral dead." Id. at 3. "It would never occur to mourners
to visit a grave without coca leaves." Id. at 7. Indigenous Andeans believe that
"coca protects them from the sickening wind of the dead, and that it comforts them
in their grief. Chewing coca together, they are drawn as a group into a shared
communion with the Earth." Id.
57. SANABRIA, supra note 3, at 38. Gifts of coca leaves are common as gifts in
indigenous marriage ceremonies and other social settings: "The offering and use of
coca also cements other social obligations, functions as an index of cultural identity,
and serves as a medium of communication between humans and supernatural
beings." Id.
58. Id.
59. See ALLEN, supra note 40, at 276 (defining phukuy as the "ritual offering in
which one blows over coca or food in order to share it with the deities"). This
practice "draws the human actor into a relationship with the Earth and the Sacred
Places." Id. at 107.
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many communities are used as valid currency or a medium of
60
exchange.
C. Coca and the Bolivian Economy
The important place of coca in traditional Bolivian society
created a large demand for the plant, and centuries ago coca
farming became a stable and profitable trade for thousands of
farmers. 6 1 In the 1980s, as many as a quarter million people in Bolivia
relied on coca for their livelihoods. 62 In the last several decades,
however, highland farming for traditional uses has been
overshadowed by massive cultivation in the tropical regions to
support the cocaine trade.
1. TraditionalHighland Cultivation
Traditional coca farming provided a small but consistent
source of income for many highland peasants for centuries before
the cocaine boom of the 1980s. Historically, farming for
traditional uses has taken place in the Yungas, a high mountainous
region northeast of La Paz. 6 3 Traditionally, Yungas coca plants
were grown in terraced fields carved into the steep mountain
hillsides. 6 4 The sturdy bushes are resistant to insects and can
survive in poor soil with little attention. 65 When the leaves are
mature, they are picked by hand, allowed time to dry in the sun,
and then shipped and sold at village markets. 66 A fully grown
67
plant will yield as many as four crops each year.
The time-honored, small scale cultivation in the Yungas looks
much different from modern farming for the drug trade in the
Chapare. Today, coca grown in both the Chapare region near
60. See SANABRIA, supra note 3, at 38.
61. Lons & Sanabria, supra note 4, at 3-4.
62. End of Coca Growing Brings Deep Changes to Bolivian Region, CNN,

Dec. 26,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

1999, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/bolivia/coca.htm.
See South, supra note 36, at 24.
Id. at 27.
ALLEN, supra note 40, at 190.
Id.
Id.
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Cochabamba and the Yapachani region in the Santa Cruz
department is much more likely to be grown for cocaine, in
contrast to the traditional cultivation in the Yungas highlands. 68 In
fact, coca plants grown in the lower-altitude Chapare jungle are
preferred by drug producers because their leaves contain a higher
69
percentage of cocaine than Yungas coca plants.
2. Cocaine Synthesis and Illicit Cultivation
The process of cocaine synthesis was created in Germany in the
nineteenth century, after which it was widely touted for its medicinal
uses.70 After the turn of the century, cocaine became the subject of
widespread regulation and its use did not become popular as a
recreational drug until the last half of the twentieth century.71 As the
international demand for cocaine spiked in the 1960s, entrepreneurs
began clearing large patches of jungle in the Chapare, and migrants in
search of work gradually descended from the high Andes to the
lowland jungles to farm coca, which was then boiled down to a coca
paste. 2 Peasants then sold the coca paste to drug traffickers who
refined it further, usually outside of Bolivia, to create white powder
cocaine.73 Drug planes or boats then carried the cocaine from South
74
America to be sold on the streets of the United States and Europe.
III. THE U.S. WAR ON DRUGS AND ANTI-COCA LAWS IN BOLIVIA
As cocaine use reached epidemic proportions in the United
States in the late twentieth century, and when prohibition on its

68. Lons, supra note 49, at 123.
69. See id. The milder Yungas coca however, with less natural cocaine in its
leaves, is preferred by traditional users to Chapare coca. Id.
70. ALLEN, supra note 40, at 191. Cocaine synthesis is a multi-step, highly
technical process, requiring, among other things, a lot of sulfuric acid, kerosene, and
heat. See JOEL L. PHILLIPS & RONALD W. WYNNE, COCAINE: THE MYSTIQUE AND
THE REALITY 119-21 (1980); Ldons & Sanabria, supra note 4, at 15-16.
71. PHILLIPS & WYNNE, supra note 70, at 79, 173-74. For a discussion of the
early regulation of cocaine use in the United States, see infra Part III.A.
72. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 8, at 103.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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use failed to solve the problem, U.S. policy makers turned their
attention to the drug-producing regions of South America. A
major goal of the war on cocaine became the reduction of the raw
material, coca.7 5 This Part will describe the supply-reduction
theory generally, as well as the integral role played by the U.S.
government in the passage and enforcement of Bolivian drug
control laws and the establishment of an anti-drug legal regime in
Bolivia.
A. Cocaine and the Beginning of the War on Drugs
In the late nineteenth century, cocaine was lauded by wellrespected doctors and scientists as, among other things, a cure for
morphine and alcohol addiction and an effective anesthetic.7 6 In
1884, an Austrian physician, Sigmund Freud, called cocaine a
''magical drug" for its power to cure addiction and its ability to
soothe general ailments. 7 7 So popular was this new drug that
American companies began to incorporate small amounts of
cocaine in soft drinks, soaps, medicines, and even cigarettes.78
Soon, however, the medical establishment recognized the
addictive and psychotic power of cocaine as well as the risk of
fatal overdose. The endorsement of cocaine was retracted by most
doctors and medical journals by the end of the nineteenth
century. 7 9 At first, cocaine was regulated exclusively by the states,
many of which limited its use to a medical anesthetic.8 0 The
75. BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, PART I:
DRUG AND CHEMICAL CONTROL 11, 16 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/29955.pdf [hereinafter INCSR 2004 PART I].

76. Stephen Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and
Destructivenessof Prohibition,1983 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1310-12 (1983).
77. Id. at 13 10-11. Freud, who became a cocaine user himself, also suggested
the drug for use as an aphrodisiac and as a remedy for asthma and digestive
problems. Id. at 1310 & n.30.
78. Id. at 1311. For example, the popular soft drink Coca-Cola originally
contained cocaine and the ingredient was not substituted with caffeine until 1903.
PHILLIPS & WYNNE, supra note 70, at 53; Wisotsky, supra note 76, at 1311 n.35.
79. Wisotsky, supra note 76, at 1312. Freud also stopped using the drug by
1895. See id. at 1312 n.37.
80. PHILLIPS & WYNNE, supra note 70, at 73-74.
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Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 was the first federal statute
directly regulating the use of cocaine. 81 The Act, strengthened by
amendments made through the 1920s, eventually prohibited the
non-medicinal use of cocaine altogether, making it illegal
everywhere in the United States. 82 Cocaine's prevalence initially
declined in the decades following the Harrison Act, but by the
1960s, the United States was again battling an epidemic of
83
cocaine addiction.
On June 17, 1971, President Richard Nixon officially declared
a "War on Drugs" in the United States, calling the country's drug
abuse problem "public enemy number one." 84 In the nearly four
decades since Nixon's declaration, U.S. drug control policy has
become increasingly centered upon a source-country drug control
strategy, or a supply-reduction approach. In the case of the war on
cocaine, the reduction of the supply of coca in South America has
become a focus of foreign drug policy, especially in the three
major coca and cocaine producing nations: Bolivia, Colombia, and
Peru. 85
B. The Supply-Reduction Approach
Without peanuts, there would be no peanut butter, and likewise,
without coca there would be no cocaine. The theory of supplyreduction as a drug control policy is analogous, and it is both simple
and logical: without the materials to produce illegal drugs, dealers
81. Id. at 78. The Act provided for the registration of persons involved with
distributing opiates and imposed a special tax upon such persons. Harrison Narcotics
Act, ch. 1, § 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). Although the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906
had previously attempted to indirectly regulate cocaine distribution, the Harrison
Narcotics Act was the first to deal directly with cocaine and other narcotic drugs.
PHILLIPS & WYNNE, supra note 70,at 75.
82. Wisotsky, supra note 76, at 1312-13.
83. Id. at 1313.
84. See PBS.org, Thirty Years of America's Drug War: A Chronology,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2009). President Reagan also declared a "War on Drugs" during a speech in 1982.
See Leslie Maitland, PresidentGives Plan to Combat Drug Networks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1982, at Al (describing the President's plan to attack the narcotics business
of organized crime).
85. INCSR 2004 PART I, supra note 75, at 11.
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cannot distribute those drugs to potential users. Initiatives for the
reduction of coca production in source countries have been advocated
by the U.S. State Department and include giving financial aid and
training to the military and police organizations in Andean nations in
hopes of decreasing the amount of coca grown, often by physically
destroying crops:
Our objective is to reduce and ultimately cut off the flow of illegal
drugs to the United States....
. . . The closer we can attack to the source, the greater the
likelihood of halting the flow of drugs altogether. Crop control is
by far the most cost-effective means of cutting [drug] supply. If we
destroy crops or force them to remain unharvested, no drugs will
enter the system. 86

Advocates of this approach cite the market principles of supply
and demand to justify crop reduction, claiming that decreasing or
eliminating crop yields in the Andes will decrease the amount of
cocaine in the world market and in turn drive up the street price of
87
cocaine in the United States, thus decreasing the drug's prevalence.

86. Id. at 16.
87. See id. at 16-17. This Article focuses only on the political consequences
resulting from U.S. support for the supply-reduction strategy and will not comment
on the overall effectiveness of the strategy. However, there is much philosophical
opposition to the supply-reduction approach. Opponents of the supply-reduction
strategy argue that reducing the demand for cocaine in countries like the United
States is the only way to discourage illegal coca cultivation and mitigate the cocaine
epidemic; many, in fact, point out that drug availability in the United States has
increased, while its price has fallen, as evidence of supply-reduction's failure. See,
e.g., TED GALEN CARPENTER, BAD NEIGHBOR POLICY: WASHINGTON'S FUTILE WAR
ON DRUGS IN LATIN AMERICA 6-7 (2003) (discussing the failures of U.S. policy
efforts to drive up the retail prices of illegal drugs, which have actually declined in
recent years).
[T]he campaign against the supply of illegal drugs is no closer to success
than it was when Nixon first issued his declaration of war. The U.S. State
Department's own figures show that a larger quantity of drugs is flowing
out of Latin America today than during the mid-1980s... despite a
concerted effort by the United States and the drug-source countries to
eradicate the supply.
CARPENTER, supra, at 6.
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C. Anti-Coca Laws in Bolivia and U.S. Influence
As part of its supply-reduction strategy, the United States has
been pushing for the passage of anti-narcotics laws in Bolivia. U.S.
policy makers felt that strong efforts to reduce the amount of coca
grown in Bolivia-by eradicating coca crops and promoting
alternative crop development-would decrease the amount of cocaine
in the United States.8 8 To be successful, however, this effort would
require the full support of the Bolivian government, which would have
to enact and enforce tough anti-coca laws. Since the 1980s, Bolivia
has passed several major counterdrug initiatives in an effort to gain
control over the coca trade. 89 And behind nearly every coca control
strategy implemented by the Bolivian government has been the United
States, providing advice, financial assistance, and, if necessary,
90
economic coercion.
This Part will describe the major anti-coca laws passed by the
Bolivian Congress and will explain how U.S. pressure helped to bring
about those measures. The Part will conclude by describing three
pieces of U.S. legislation that have been used to provide economic
incentives or coercion for Bolivia to bring about these anti-drug
measures and destroy coca: the Andean Regional Initiative, the
Andean Trade Protection and Development Enhancement Act, and the
Foreign Assistance Act.
1. The United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
The first major attack on Bolivians' right to grow and use coca
came in 1961 when the government, despite the opposition of the
country's indigenous majority, signed the United Nations Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Single Convention). 91 The Single
Convention labeled coca as a narcotic drug, grouping it with cocaine,
thereby classifying-and stigmatizing-coca cultivation as the
"production" and "trafficking" of illegal drugs. 92 The Single
88. INCSR 2004 PART I, supranote 75, at 16.
89. See Lons & Sanabria, supra note 4, at 21-23.
90. Id. at 23-25.
91. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T.
1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 151.
92. Id. art. 1 (defining "illicit traffic" to include "cultivation or trafficking in
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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Convention also outlined several goals for Bolivia, including crop
substitution programs and one very ambitious goal: the complete
eradication of illicit coca cultivation in the country. 93 In 1973, to help
implement its obligations under the Single Convention, Bolivia
enacted Law 11245, which created a National Office for the Control
of Dangerous Substances (NOCDS),94 required the registration of
coca growers, and provided some assistance to farmers who agreed to
grow crops other than coca. 95 Although the coca growers resisted the
ratification of the Single Convention-and the creation of the
coca
NOCDS-little changed for coca growers after its passage, and
96
1980s.
and
1970s
the
through
cultivation continued to increase
2. Law 1008
More than twenty-five years after the ratification of the Single
Convention, Bolivia had still not eradicated its illegal coca cultivation;
97
in fact, cultivation had increased dramatically by the late 1980s.
During the coca boom in the Chapare during the 1980s, the Bolivian
government decided to take a harder line on coca. The principal anticoca law of the period, the Law of the Regime Applicable to Coca and
Controlled Substances (Law 1008), was passed by the Bolivian
Congress in 1988.98 The law placed limitations on the number of
hectares9 9 on which coca could be grown, essentially outlawing

drugs contrary to the provisions of this convention"); see also L6ons & Sanabria,
supra note 4, at 21.
93. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 91, art. 22.
94. Melanie R. Hallums, Note, Bolivia and Coca: Law, Policy, and Drug
Control, 30 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 817, 829 & n.61 (1997). The NOCDS was
dedicated to the "gradual, systematic, and planned reduction of coca leaf cultivation
in [Bolivia]" Id. (quoting COCA AND COCAINE: AN ANDEAN PERSPECTIVE 17 (Felipe
E. Mac Gregor ed., Jonathan Cavanaugh & Rosemary Underhay trans., 1993)).
95. Hallums, supra note 94, at 829 n.61.
96. SANABRIA, supra note 3, at 59.
97. Id. Between 1987 and 1988, for example, cultivation increased an
astounding twenty-four percent in Bolivia. See RENSSELAER W. LEE III, THE WHITE
LABYRINTH: COCAINE AND POLITICAL POWER 204 (1989).
98. Ley No. 1008, 19 July 1988, Ley del R6gimen de la Coca y Sustancias
Controladas [Coca and Controlled Substances Law], Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia, 22
July 1988 [hereinafter Law 1008].
99. A hectare is a unit of land measurement used in South America and is
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cultivation in the Chapare.100 Law 1008 also created a plan to begin
the physical eradication of coca fields and instituted a new judicial
system with draconian rules for use in drug-related trials.' 0 ' The
Single Convention was often ignored by farmers, but Law 1008 and
the new legal system it created for drug-related offenses had a drastic
effect on coca growers. While still not dissuaded from coca cultivation
altogether, 10 2 peasant farmers of coca became susceptible to more
arrests and incarcerations and were subject to new criminal
procedures.
Law 1008 was enacted at the urging of the U.S. government and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 10 3 The law
was passed by the Bolivian legislature only after the Reagan
Administration threatened to deny Bolivia millions in foreign aid if it
failed to pass drug legislation. 10 4 Critics of Law 1008 also claim that
USAID played a major role in the actual drafting of the law-or that
USAID officials in fact helped write Law 1008.105 Bolivians
unanimously believe that international pressure led to the enactment

roughly equivalent to 2.5 acres. THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND
THESAURUS 680 (2d ed. 2003).

100. See Chandra Triplett, Commentary, Ley Del Rdgimen de la Coca y
Sustancias Controladas, 6 INTER-AM. LEGAL MATERIALs 278, 280-81 (1995),

available at http://www.natlaw.com/interam/bo/cs/sp/spbocsl.htm (describing Law
1008 as declaring most Chapare coca as "excess and transitional" and subject to

eradication).
101. Id. at 281. The law, for example, imposes mandatory sentences for drug
crimes, and all evidence is admissible at trial, regardless of how it is obtained.
Solimar Santos, Comment, Unintended Consequences of the United States' Foreign
Drug Policy in Bolivia, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 127, 135 (2002). Further,

even if acquitted in a lower court, Law 1008 mandates that suspects be imprisoned
until the Supreme Court has ruled on the case. Thea Luna, Bolivia's Prisonsand the
Impact of Law 1008, ANDEAN INFORMATION NETWORK, Aug. 1, 2004, http://ain-

bolivia.org/index2.php?option=com content&dopdf=l&id=64; see also DANGL,
supra note 16, at 47 ("Many are sentenced with very shaky evidence; in some cases,
a simple police report is enough to send a suspect to jail.").
102. Coca cultivation, however, did decline in Bolivia during the 1990s. See
Santos, supra note 101, at 139.
103. Triplett, supra note 100, at 292-93.
104. Santos, supra note 101, at 134 n.40 ("In 1988 the Reagan administration
froze fifty percent of U.S. aid until the Bolivian Congress approved the law.").
105. See Triplett, supra note 100, at 280; Cook, supra note 16, at 57, 71.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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of Law 1008, and they refer to it with disdain as the "Law of
' 10 6

Foreigners."

3. Plan Dignidad
Despite the restrictions imposed by Law 1008, the cocaleros
continued to grow coca well into the 1990s. Law 1008 proved
ineffective in reducing the amount of cocaine exported from Bolivia,
so the government took a harder line to eradicate the crops with the
adoption of Plan Dignidad in 1998.107 Adopted under military
dictator-turned-President Hugo Banzer, Plan Dignidad (the "Dignity
Plan") was a proposal for "zero coca," meaning the complete
eradication of illegal coca in Bolivia by 2002.108 Plan Dignidad was
more ambitious than Law 1008, which had proposed only gradual
reductions in coca cultivation through crop substitution programs. The
Plan did provide for compensation to farmers who would lose money
when forced to abandon coca, but the assistance programs were never
109
well funded and expired after five years.
As with Law 1008, the United States was deeply involved in the
passage and the implementation of Plan Dignidad. The Clinton
Administration, hoping to see the complete eradication of Bolivian
coca, promised the Banzer government funding for crop eradication,
alternative development, and debt forgiveness to help encourage
passage of the Plan. 110 The U.S. State Department also threatened

106. Hallums, supra note 94, at 835.
107. Reptiblica de Bolivia, TPor la Dignidad! EstrategiaBoliviana de la Lucha
Contra el Narcotrdfico:1998-2002, [Dignity Plan] (1998).
108. MORALES, supra note 37, at 223-24, 232. In effect, the complete
eradication of "illegal" coca under the Plan meant the complete eradication of
Chapare coca. The Dignity Plan retained Law 1008's allowances for traditional
farming in the Yungas region. See DANGL, supra note 16, at 45. The physical
destruction of coca plants, a major component of Plan Dignidad,will be discussed
in Part lI.D, infra.
109. See Santos, supra note 101, at 139.
110. Press Release, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, United
States
Supports
Bolivia's
"Plan
Dignidad"
(Sept.
29,
2000),
http://fas.org/irp/news/2000/09/irp-000929-bolivia.htm. President Clinton himself
pressured Banzer to strengthen the Plan by focusing on the eradication of all coca
cultivation, and that the Bolivian military, instead of police forces, should be
responsible for enforcing Plan Dignidad.DANGL, supra note 16, at 45.
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Bolivia with decertification as an ally in the drug war, meaning large
cuts in aid, if it failed to reduce illicit coca production.'' Further, the
United States conditioned other funds for infrastructure and education
in Bolivia on the successful eradication of coca under Plan
112

Dignidad.

By most accounts, Plan Dignidadhas been successful in reducing
coca cultivation in Bolivia, especially in the cocaine-producing
Chapare region. 1 3 The majority of coca farms-including all
"commercially significant" farms-were destroyed by 2000.114
However, many Bolivians do not see Plan Dignidadas a success. The
crop substitution programs, designed to provide profitable alternatives
to growing coca, have never proven very successful, and farmers have
been unable to make the same profits off sales of the alternative
crops.115 A poor national infrastructure, moreover, prevents many
farmers from selling crops because they simply cannot get them to
111. See Jane E. Becker, Acting Assistant Sec'y of State, Bureau for Int'l
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Drug Trafficking Prevention Efforts:
Statement to the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the H. Comm. On Int'l
Relations, 1997 WL 460618 (July 16, 1997); see also BUREAU FOR INT'L
NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1996
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (1997), available at

http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcoticslaw/1996_narcreport/exesum96.html.
112. See DANGL, supra note 16, at 44; see also Cook, supra note 16, at 83-84.
113. Santos, supra note 101, at 139. The U.S State Department, in fact, hails
Bolivia as a "model for the region in coca eradication." BUREAU FOR INT'L
NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FISCAL YEAR

2003 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 19 (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10694.pdf [hereinafter 2003 BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION]. Critics of the supply side strategy argue that when coca cultivation
was regulated and eradicated in the Chapare,drug operations moved farther into the
jungle and to other regions in Colombia and Peru, and thus, there is no less cocaine
on American streets despite all the coca destroyed in Bolivia. See, e.g., CARPENTER,
supra note 87, at 6.
114. Santos, supra note 101, at 139. By 2000, coca cultivation had been
reduced as much as ninety percent in the Chapare region. 2003 BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION, supra note 113, at 19.

115. Kathryn Ledebur, Coca and Conflict in the Chapare,WOLA DRUG WAR
MONITOR, July 2002, at 2-4, available at http://www.wola.org/media/ddhr_
boliviabrief.pdf. During one protest against alternative development, Chapare
farmers piled rotting pineapples and bananas-crops that they were supposed to
grow instead of coca-along a road because the crops were practically worthless. Id.
at 5.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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markets. 11 6 Critics argue that Plan Dignidad's "zero coca" goal for
Bolivia has meant even more poverty for the already poor nation. 1 7
Cocaleros and their families have also suffered alleged human rights
violations by the soldiers and police charged with carrying out the
physical destruction of the coca fields. 18
4. The Andean CounterdrugInitiative
Eradication efforts under Plan Dignidadwere, and still are, aided
and partially funded by several U.S. programs, the most significant of
which is the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). 119 The ARI, initially
proposed by the Bush Administration in 2001, is administered by the
U.S. Department of State, and is designed to "promote and support
democracy and democratic institutions, foster sustainable economic
development and trade liberalization, and significantly reduce the
supply of illegal drugs to the U.S. at the source." 1 20 However, the
majority of the funding-just under $700 million when first approved
by Congress for the 2002 fiscal year-goes to a subsidiary program,
the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), that is administered by the
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL).12 1 The ACI funds anti-drug programs in seven Central and

116.

Id. at 3-4; see also

MEMORANDUM

No.

988,

STEPHEN JOHNSON, HERITAGE FOUND., EXECUTIVE
BOLIVIAN ELECTION REVEALS NEED FOR BROADER

ENGAGEMENT
1 (2006), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
LatinAmerica/upload/93365_ .pdf.
117. Ledebur, supra note 115, at 2.
118. Santos, supra note 101, at 139 ("Coca is not the only thing that has been
eradicated in the advent of Plan Dignidad;human rights and the citizens' trust in the
government and the police have also been destroyed in the interim."). Not
coincidentally, the rise of the MAS corresponds with the advent of Plan Dignidad.
See discussion infra, Part IV.
119. K. LARRY STORRS & NINA M. SERAFINO, CRS REPORT RL31016,

(ARI): FY2002 ASSISTANCE FOR COLOMBIA AND
1 (2001), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/

ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE

NEIGHBORS

7948.pdf.
120. Luz Estrella Nagle, Global Terrorism in Our Own Backyard: Colombia's
Legal War Against Illegal Armed Groups, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.

5, 58-59 (2005).
121. Id. at 59.
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South American countries, 1but
the majority of ACI dollars go to
22
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.
It is through the ACI that U.S. money actually finds its way to the
Bolivian programs which destroy drug crops. In 2004, the ACI
provided over $90 million to Bolivia for counterdrug operations, with
a large portion to help fund Bolivia's eradication campaigns. 123 The
ACI, for example, allocates approximately $10 million to eradication
efforts, including a "Joint Eradication Task Force" (JTF) of Bolivian
soldiers who are in charge of carrying out the crop eradication
components of Plan Dignidad.124 The JTF "consists of 1,600 military,
police and civilian personnel, with one-half of the force providing
security for the other half, which engages in coca eradication
operations."' 125 ACI money is used for fuel and vehicles and to feed,
train, and house the members of the Bolivian military and police who
destroy the crops. 126 ACI funding is also used to purchase and
maintain aircraft used by several divisions of the Bolivian military in
27
its eradication efforts.
122. CONNIE VIELLETTE, CRS REPORT RL33253, ANDEAN COUNTERDRUG
INITIATIVE (ACI) AND RELATED FUNDING PROGRAMS: FY2006 ASSISTANCE 2-3
(2006),
available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/60720.pdf
[hereinafter ACI BUDGET]. The three countries received a total of $657 million of
the ACI's approximately $734 million budget in 2006. Id.
123. See id. at 8-9. However, the ACI budget is not a good indicator of the
actual amount the United States spends to aid coca eradication, and in fact the INL
likely spends much more on eradication than the budget breakdown indicates. For
example, several units of the Bolivian military receive equipment and funding from
the ACI budget and are responsible for helping to carry out eradication efforts. Id.
Yet aid for these military groups is considered aid for "law enforcement" or

"institution building" in the ACI budget and is not counted as interdiction or
eradication. See id. at 1-3.
124. BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, FISCAL YEAR 2004 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 22-24
(2003), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22061.pdf.
125. Id. at 22.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 21-22. The Red Devils Task Force and the Black Devils Task Force
fly helicopters and large transport planes to support anti-drug operations in Bolivia.
Id. The State Department's funding justification provides some insight into how ACI
money is used:
The Black Devils Task Force (BLDTF), also made up of Bolivian Air
Force personnel, fly three C-130B aircraft in support of counternarcotics
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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The ACI allocates money to promote alternative economic
development and crop substitution programs in Bolivia in hopes that
coca farmers will be able to sustain profits by growing non-drug
crops. Further, the ACI funds go to such programs as rural
electrification, conservation, and infrastructure projects in an effort to
28
promote tourism as a long-term economic resource to Bolivians.
The non-eradication measures funded by the ACI, however, are
overshadowed by the unpopular eradication campaigns, even though
12 9
relatively few U.S. dollars actually support eradication operations.
5. The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug EradicationAct
The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA) is one of the major tools used by U.S. policy makers to
encourage Bolivia to enact anti-drug laws like Law 1008 and Plan
Dignidad. The ATPDEA, first enacted in 1991 as the Andean Trade
Preference Act, 130 but subsequently amended and renamed in 2002,131
seeks to promote alternative products that would be lucrative for
farmers and decrease the incentive to grow illicit coca. 13 2 Essentially a

and eradication missions. Enhanced interdiction and eradication operations
will necessitate additional funding for FY 2004. Conversion of 12 of the
16 UH-1H helicopters to Huey Ils, originally planned to start in FY 02,
was postponed due to insufficient funding. FY 2004 funding will be used
to start this essential, multi-year upgrade, as spare part availability for the
older helicopters is fast dwindling.
Id. at21.
128. Id. at 22-23.
129. See id. at 20, 24. It is difficult to tell from the ACI budget how much
money is actually spent on coca eradication. However, in 2006, the INL requested at
least $43 million to "continue eradication programs in the Chapare and Yungas
regions, provide training for police, maintain support for Bolivian security forces
riverine and ground operations, and aviation programs." ACI BUDGET, supra note
122, at 8.
130. Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, Title II, 105 Stat.
1236 (1991).
131. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, Pub. L. No. 107-210,
Div. C, Title XXXI, 116 Stat. 1023 (2002).
132. Id. For more on the ATPDEA and how it relates to Bolivia, see Cameron
Ming, Comment, Zero Coca, Zero Culture: Bolivia's Struggle to Balance Cultural
Identity and the Need for Economic Stability in the Midst of the Expiring Andean
Trade Promotion and Drug EradicationAct, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009

27

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2009], Art. 2

264 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

one-sided free trade agreement, the ATPDEA provides producers in
several South American countries-Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia-duty-free access to the U.S. market for any product not
specifically excluded. 33 Exempting tariffs pursuant to the ATPDEA,
however, is at the discretion of the President. 134 The implicit but
constant threat of exemption, therefore, gives the United States
continuous leverage over Bolivia's domestic drug policy.
Although President Bush has allowed all four countries to
participate since 2002, neither he nor his successors are obligated to
continue to do so, and there is reason to believe that Bolivia could lose
its ATPDEA privilege if it fails to perform adequately in its anti-drug
efforts. To be eligible to participate in the ATPDEA, a country must
meet two sets of criteria: mandatory and discretionary.' 35 If the
President determines that a country does not meet any of the
mandatory criteria-which include, among other requirements,
maintaining a non-communist government and a satisfactory human
rights record-then the President may not allow the nation to
participate. 136 Discretionary criteria include compliance with the
international trade standards and satisfactory progress combating the
illegal drug trade. 137 The President may deny certification to a country
if he determines that the country is not in compliance with "the
counternarcotics certification criteria set forth in section 490 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. "138 Section 490 directs the President

(2007).

133. 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (2006).
134. Id.

135. U.S.

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SECOND REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE

OPERATION OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT AS AMENDED

11 (2005),

available at http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USAATPA/Studies/2005Report-e.pdf
[hereinafter USTR SECOND REPORT].

136. 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c) (2006); USTR SECOND REPORT, supra note 135, at
11-12. There is, however, one exception to this rule: if the President finds that it is in
the best "economic or security interest of the United States" to allow the country to
participate, he may permit it to do so, despite the country's non-compliance with a
mandatory criterion. USTR SECOND REPORT, supra note 135, at 12.
137.

19 U.S.C. § 3202(d) (2006); USTR SECOND REPORT, supra note 135, at

13-14.
138. USTR SECOND

REPORT,

supra note 135, at 13-14.
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to consider whether the country has, among other things, taken
1 39
prudent steps to reduce illicit drug crop cultivation.
Therefore, Bolivia must cooperate with U.S. goals for coca
reduction or risk being excluded from the ATPDEA, which would be
devastating for a country dependant on trade with the United States.
When asked if Bolivia's participation in the ATPDEA program was
dependant upon its meeting coca eradication goals, then-acting U.S.
Ambassador Daniel Santos replied, seemingly in the affirmative:
"[p]articipation in the ATPDEA program is marked by certain
requirements and conditions that dictate that the war on drugs must
continue."' 140 The threat of exclusion from the ATPDEA, therefore, is
one further means through which the United States exerts pressure on
Bolivia to implement and enforce tough anti-coca laws.
6. The ForeignAssistance Act
Another major tool used by the United States to influence
41
domestic policy in Bolivia is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
The Act reorganized foreign assistance programs and established
USAID, which became responsible for developing and coordinating
many of the programs. USAID has been involved in helping to draft
14 2
and implement many Bolivian anti-drug laws.
The Foreign Assistance Act was amended in 1988 to allow the
suspension of aid to any country that does not cooperate with U.S.
drug policy. 14 3 The 1988 amendments instituted a certification process
whereby the President of the United States determines, by March 1 of
each year, whether or not a country is making satisfactory progress in
139. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j (2006); see also Ming, supra note 132, at 389-90.
140. Kathryn Ledebur, Coca Conflict Turns Violent, WOLA SPECIAL UPDATE:

BOLIVIA, Feb. 2003, available at http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=viewp&id=525&Itemid=2.
141. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 490(2)(A)-(B), 22 U.S.C. §
229 lj(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006).
142. See supra notes 103-112 and accompanying text. Law 1008, for example,
was written in consultation with USAID and at the insistence of the Reagan
Administration, and for that reason is referred to by many Bolivians as the "Law of
the Foreigners." Hallums, supra note 94, at 834-35.
143. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 486, 22 U.S.C. § 2291e (1988),
amended by International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 § 4206(a), Pub. L. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4270.
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counterdrug efforts. 144 If the President were to "decertify" Bolivia, the

United States would cancel all aid to the country and oppose any
financial assistance from other nations and from non-governmental
lenders, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. 145 The certification process is thus extremely important for the
development of countries like Bolivia that depend on foreign
assistance. 146 The Bolivian government, needing aid from the United
States and other international lenders, must cooperate with the U.S.
War on Drugs or risk losing badly needed money.
7. Their "Backs Up Against the Wall"
During the violent protests of cocaleros around La Paz in 2003
that ultimately forced the resignation of President Gonzalo Sdnchez de
Lozada (a staunch ally in the U.S. War on Drugs), a member of the
Lozada Administration explained the thorny situation regarding the
coca growers' demand that the government suspend coca eradication:
"We have our backs up against the wall. On one side, we have the
social pressure of the coca growers, and on the other, international
pressure [to continue eradication]. 147
Bolivia's anti-narcotics laws and the government's intense efforts
to combat coca growth have not been instituted because of popular

144. Section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides:
Not later than March 1 of each year, the President shall transmit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, a report containing the following: (1) For
each country that received assistance under this chapter for either of the 2
preceding fiscal years, a report on the extent to which the country has...
[taken satisfactory] action on such issues as illicit cultivation, production,
distribution, sale, transport, and financing ....
22 U.S.C. § 2291h(a)(1)(A).
145. See Foreign Assistance Act § 490, 22 U.S.C. § 2291j. Under section 490,
if a country is decertified, "[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank to vote, on and
after March 1 of each year, against any loan or other utilization of the funds of their
respective institution ....Id. § 490(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(a)(2).
146. Benjamin Dangl has written that Bolivia is so dependent on loans from
the International Monetary Fund, that without them "would not be able to pay the
salaries of public employees." DANGL, supra note 16, at 79.
147. Ledebur, supra note 140.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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support within Bolivia, but despite it. The anti-coca initiatives have
148
come about largely in response to pressure from the United States.
U.S. legislation making aid contingent on progress on the coca front is
the primary tool used by U.S. policy makers to compel cooperation
from Bolivia.
D. Physical Eradication
The physical destruction of coca generates a great deal of
animosity from the cocaleros, and it is worthwhile to examine the
process in some detail to understand why. One example is
representative. In 2003, Victor Franco, a Bolivian coca farmer, told a
U.S. reporter about how soldiers converged on his small farm outside
of Cochabamba, cutting down the family's pineapple and mandarin
trees to clear a space for a helicopter to land before they began to
destroy his coca crop with machetes. 149 His farm was completely
destroyed. Franco's wife sobbed, fearing for her family: "I have eight
'1 50
children. What are we going to live on? All our coca is gone."
The example of Victor Franco is not exceptional, and often
the most offensive, violent component of the anti-coca initiatives
in Bolivia-most notably Plan Dignidad-is the eradication of
coca farms. Further, as in the case of Franco's family, the
destruction of a coca farm can also destroy a family's only source
of income. Plan Dignidad, introduced by President Hugo Banzer in
1997, provided unprecedented funds for coca eradication to achieve
the law's goal of "zero coca" by 2002. 151 After an illegal coca farm is
spotted from the air, small groups of soldiers are dispatched to destroy
the fields, usually with machetes, and often by fire. 152 Sometimes the
process is cordial-soldiers alert farmers to prepare for their arrival
1 53
and take care to avoid harming any other crops-but often it is not.
There have been numerous reports of human rights abuses, property
148. See Triplett, supra note 100, at 292-93.
149. Reed Lindsay, Bolivian Coca Growers Fight Eradication,WASH. TIMES,

Mar. 25, 2003, at A15.
150. Id.
151. MORALES, supra note 37, at 223; Santos, supra note 101, at 138.
152. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 8, at 106-07.
153. But see, e.g., id. at 107-08 (describing an example of one rather amicable
encounter between soldiers and farmers).
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damage, even killings at the hands of the soldiers. 154 Some farmers,
however, confess that they will simply replant coca after the soldiers
leave because, with so many illegal coca fields in Bolivia, it will be
55
unlikely that theirs will be destroyed again. 1
IV. THE MORALES REVOLUTION
The theory behind the U.S. crop reduction strategy seems at first
to be a logical plan to reduce the prevalence of cocaine in the world
market. But because of Bolivia's unique cultural and economic
situation, the direct intervention by the United States in Bolivia's
domestic drug policy has created unanticipated consequences,
culminating in the election of Evo Morales to the presidency.
Evo Morales often tells his fellow indigenous Bolivians that "[tihe
fight against drug trafficking is a pretext for the U.S. to dominate
Latin America-for the U.S. to dominate our people-to violate our
sovereignty."' 5 6 This quote is representative of the rhetoric that has
proven so successful for the Bolivian President. Morales has been able
to point to the U.S. War on Drugs to argue that the American
government is trying to dominate Bolivia and suppress its indigenous
culture. His movement has combined coca activists with a strong
nationalist, anti-globalization sentiment. U.S. support for eradication
of the sacred coca leaf has allowed Morales to link two powerful bases
of support: (1) traditional unions and populist groups who oppose
neoliberal economic policies; and (2) indigenous coca growers. 'As
a result, regulation of coca came to be viewed not just as foreign
intervention into Bolivia's economy, but as an attempt to suppress
Bolivia's indigenous culture. This atmosphere enabled the political
mobilization of an impassioned poor majority, resulting in riots and
roadblocks that have brought down two presidents, and finally, the
election of the country's first indigenous chief executive, an anti-

154. Id. at 108.

155. Lindsay, supra note 149 ("[C]ocaleros such as Victor Franco doggedly
replant their coca fields after anti-narcotics troops leave.").
156. Reynolds, supra note 1.
157. See RAGL L. MADRID, THE RISE OF ETHNO-POPUL1SM IN LATIN AMERICA:

THE BOLIVIAN CASE 23 (2006), availableat http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/
files/dooVyw/APSA_2006 paper TheRise ofEthnopopulism_.pdf.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2

32

Reisinger:
The Unintended
Revolution:
U.S. Anti-Drug
Policy and
the Socialis
2009]
U.S. ANTI-DRUG
POLICY
& THE SOCIALIST
MOVEMENT
IN BOLIVIA
269

American firebrand, Evo Morales. 158 This Part will describe Evo
Morales and explain how he and his political party have been able to
mobilize Bolivia's indigenous majority into the most powerful
political force in the country as a result of the U.S. War on Drugs.
A. Evo Morales and the Cocaleros
Although Bolivia has always suffered from endemic poverty, the
War on Drugs made the United States an easily identifiable adversary,
viewed by many as a bully who wanted to control Bolivia's economy
and suppress its culture.1 59 As U.S. intervention escalated in the 1980s
and 1990s, culminating with Plan Dignidadin 1997, Bolivia became
ripe for a socialistic revolution fueled by nationalism, poverty, and
antipathy for the foreign regulation of its sacred coca plants. Evo
Morales, a charismatic, dark-skinned coca farmer, was the man who
would lead it.
1. Evo, the Man
In 1959, Evo Morales Aima was born in a small mud hut in a
small mountain village in western Bolivia. 160 Of his six siblings, only
two lived to see adolescence. 161 While attending school, Morales
worked continuously, first as a llama herder with his father, and later
as a brick layer, occasionally finding time for his favorite pastime:

158. See Country Profile: Bolivia, supra note 9.
159. See Reynolds, supra note 1.

160. EvoMorales.net, Evo Morales Aima, Big Chief of the Original Peoples:
Childhood,

http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfilEng-infan.aspx

(last

visited Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Evo Morales: Childhood]. Evo's hometown,
Isallavi, sits at approximately 12,000 feet in elevation. DANGL, supra note 16, at 49.
The one room house into which Evo was born was three by four meters (10 feet by
12 feet), with a straw roof: "We used [the one room] as our bedroom, kitchen, dining
room and just about everything; next to it, we had a corral for our animals. We lived
in poverty like everyone else." Evo Morales: Childhood, supra.
161. Evo Morales: Childhood, supra note 160.
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ftitbol. 162 He reached only eleventh grade before beginning his
mandatory service for the Bolivian army.163
At an early age, Morales developed a sacred respect for coca, a
respect he learned from his parents. "Every morning before going to
work," he has said, "my father did his adulation to the Pachamama,
which is Mother Earth; my mother also offered to Mother Earth with
alcohol and coca leaves so that things would go well for us all day. It
164
was as if my parents were talking with the land, with nature."
2. "From the Hand of Mama Coca He Came To Power":
1 65
Evo's Rise From the Coca Unions To Congress
In 1980, when Morales was in his early twenties, the family farm
was destroyed by storms, and the Morales family-along with
thousands of other Andean families-moved from the mountains to
the lowland jungle of the Chapare, desperate to find work. 166 It was in
this drug-producing region that Evo Morales himself began to farm
coca and, later, where he began to abhor the treatment of coca growers
at the hands of government soldiers. Once, Morales watched as
soldiers interrogated a coca farmer in the Chapare, trying to get the
man to confess to producing illegal cocaine. When the farmer refused
to confess to the crime of trafficking the soldiers doused the man
with
67
gasoline and burned him alive as Morales and others watched.1
After witnessing this and other violent events, Morales began to
speak out against Law 1008 and other laws that criminalized coca
growing. He joined a coca growers union in Cochabamba, eventually
162. EvoMorales.net, Evo Morales Aima, Big Chief of the Original Peoples:
Youth, http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfilEng-juven.aspx (last visited
Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Evo Morales: Youth].
163. Id.
164. Evo Morales: Childhood, supra note 160.
165. This phrase appears on Morales' personal website. See EvoMorales.net,
Evo Morales Aima, Big Chief of the Original Peoples: Member of Parliament,
http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfil- Eng-diput.aspx (last visited Apr. 2,

2009) [hereinafter Evo Morales: Member of Parliament].
166. Evo Morales: Youth, supra note 162.
167. EvoMorales.net, Evo Morales Aima, Big Chief of the Original Peoples:
Coca Farmer, http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfil-Eng-cocal.aspx (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Evo Morales: Coca Farmer]; see also Ming, supra
note 132, at 397.
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rising through its ranks to become a respected leader. 68 Morales
pledged to "fight tirelessly for the respect of human rights, for peace,
for peace on [the farmers'] land, [and] for the free cultivation of the
coca leaf."- 169 Morales organized marches of the cocaleros on the
Bolivian capital in La Paz and protests throughout the Chapare.
During one stint in prison, Morales was told to keep faith in his cause,
for the people were behind him: "In the Chapare," he was told "there
70
are thousands of Evos.'
What started for Morales as a one-issue campaign to protect the
right to grow coca gradually became a larger goal to protect the rights
of Bolivia's poor majority:
I believe that my only full time occupation, one hundred percent,
my true passion . . . has been, and is, the defense of the coca
leaf... but now also the defense of natural resources, the rights of
the country's poor and exploited, the thousands of workers and
unemployed, the re-foundation of17our
homeland, the defense of
1
national sovereignty and life itself.
Morales found that the cocaleros' wrath over the regulation of
coca was just one symptom of a larger problem: Bolivians believed
that countries like the United States, and their corporations, were
stealing the country's resources and trying to destroy Andean culture.
Protecting the right of Bolivians to grow coca was just one part of a
larger need to protect the rights of Bolivia's proud indigenous
majority. Morales began to rail against not only the United States for
its "imperialist" drug policies, but also against all foreign interests
who were exploiting Bolivia's natural resources and profiting without
compensating Bolivia's poor citizens. In his speeches, he virulently
denounced capitalism, which he called "the worst enemy of
humanity," and opposed the U.S. War on Drugs, which he labeled a
"mechanism of imperial domination. ' 172 And in 1995, he formed a

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. EvoMorales.net, Evo Morales Aima, Big Chief of the Original Peoples:
Union Leader, http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfilEng-sindi.aspx (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Evo Morales: Union Leader].
171. Id.
172. Kurtz-Phelan, supra note 8, at 105.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009

35

California
Western International
Law Journal, Vol. 39,
No.JOURNAL
2 [2009], Art. 2[Vol. 39
272
CALIFORNIA
WESTERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW

political party, the Political Tool for the Sovereignty of the Common
People, later renamed the Movimiento al Socialism ("Movement
Toward Socialism" or MAS). 173

Ultimately, the MAS became

dedicated to protecting coca and redistributing profits from Bolivia's
174
natural resources to all citizens.
Morales' fiery rhetoric and idyllic speeches about the wealth
Bolivia will find when the country's resources are returned to the
people appeal to many impoverished Bolivians longing for better
lives. As Morales became the celebrity spokesman for Bolivia's poor,
and for their coca, he gained millions of supporters and persuaded
many indigenous citizens to support the MAS, as opposed to one of
the other left-of-center political parties. Morales and the MAS found
that they had a strong and growing base of support in Bolivia's
indigenous majority. He was elected to Bolivia's National Congress in
1997 and would run for the presidency in 2002.175 Morales lost in his
first run for president, but finished only one percentage point behind
176
the eventual winner, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada.
B. Morales' Party: The MAS
The MAS and Evo Morales' influence was built upon the anger of
the coca growers. But, for the MAS to become a national political
movement, Morales had to inspire the majority of Bolivians who were
not directly impacted by restrictions on coca growth. Morales was
able to rise to the presidency because he consolidated the votes of
Indians, cocaleros, and Bolivian nationalists, without alienating white
mestizos. The MAS, although born from coca growers' unions, came

173.

DANUL, supra note 16, at 49.

174. Id.
175. Evo Morales: Member of Parliament, supra note 165. Morales was
removed from office by the Banzer Administration for seemingly baseless charges
of ethical impropriety, alleging that Morales had committed "serious inadequacies in
the execution of his duties." Id. But ousting Morales proved to be an unwise political
move; Morales instantly became a martyr in the cause of indigenous rights and was
more popular than ever before. Id.
176. EvoMorales.net, Evo Morales Aima, Big Chief of the Original Peoples:
The Road to Power, http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/perfil Engjrevue.aspx
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Evo Morales: The Road to Power].
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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to represent Indians, rural poor, and all patriotic Bolivians who saw
177
foreign intervention in their country as illegal and unjustified.
1. Bolivia's Politics Before the MAS

Bolivia's modern political history began in 1952, when, for the
178
first time, indigenous Bolivians were given the right to vote.
Between 1952 and the rise of the MAS in the 1990s, the rural Indian
vote was fractured between several left-of-center political parties,
including the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), the Left
Revolutionary Movement (MIR), the Nationalistic Democratic Action
(ADN), and the Concienca de Patria (CONDEPA). 179 For decades,
one of these parties, with the support of various minor parties,
controlled Bolivia's government. However, "[lt]he failure of these

or social peace to
parties to bring significant socio-economic progress
'1 80
support."
their
undermined
Bolivia gradually
2. The Rise of the MAS
Before the late 1990s, no political party had ever enjoyed the
support of the majority of indigenous Bolivians, and never had an
indigenous candidate been a major political figure. CONDEPA
enjoyed the most indigenous support of any of Bolivia's political
parties before the rise of the MAS.1 81 CONDEPA used traditional
populist rhetoric, and its stronghold was Aymara-speaking regions, yet
the party never attracted more than seventeen percent of the popular
vote and was never able to receive a majority of the indigenous
vote. 182
177. DANGL, supra note 16, at 49 ("[The] MAS has utilized the coca leaf as a
political tool that . . . represents the direct struggle against U.S. imperialism via
resistance to the War on Drugs.").
178. Mary Crane, Council on Foreign Relations, Bolivia's Presidential
Elections, BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 16, 2005.
179. MADRID, supra note 157, at 12, 20.
180. Id. at 20.
181. Id. at 19 ("Prior to the MAS, the only Bolivian party that had successfully
developed an ethno-populist appeal was Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA).
CONDEPA was not precisely an indigenous party-its founder, Carlos Palenque,
and many of its top leaders were mestizos . .
182. Id.
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The MAS was founded in 1997-the same year that President
Banzer introduced Plan Dignidad and its widespread eradication
measures-and the influence of MAS grew steadily in each election
cycle. Although formed around the narrow issue of coca rights, many
other factors have contributed to the rise of the MAS into Bolivia's
preeminent political power. The MAS was able to gain most of the
populist support held by CONDEPA, but the MAS became more
powerful than CONDEPA ever was because the MAS and Evo
Morales became known as the defenders of coca.183 Morales was able
to consolidate indigenous communities along with the fractured
peasant, coca-grower, and nationalist groups behind a single political
party opposed to the regulation of 184
coca, foreign intervention, and the
exploitation of Bolivia's resources.
a. Consolidationof the Indigenous Vote
To be successful nationally, the first thing the MAS had to do was
consolidate the Indian vote, which had never coalesced around a
single party. 185 Morales, who is dark-skinned and grew up speaking
the Quechua and Aymara languages, evolved as the charismatic
personality needed to lead the party. Never before had a major
political party in Bolivia been led by an Indian, and Morales' figure
alone drew support from indigenous voters. 186 Significantly, Morales
appealed to both the Quechua and Aymara peoples' 87 because,
although he was himself Aymara, he had lived in Quechua areas,
183. Id.; DANGL, supra note 16, at 48-49; Crane, supra note 178.
184.

MADRID, supra note 157, at 5. Professor Madrid writes that the cocaleros

initially had a powerful influence on the development of the MAS: "The coca
grower unions, and other indigenous organizations, have provided the MAS with
leaders, activists, and a modicum of material resources that they have used in their
campaigns." Id. at 12.
185. Id. at 18-20.
186. Two-thirds of Bolivia's population is of indigenous descent, the largest
percentage of any country in South America. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: BOLIVIA,
supra note 14. It is hard to overstate the importance of Morales' skin color to many
Bolivians; while Bolivian Indians make up a majority of the population, they had
still never seen a major candidate who looked like them. See id.
187. Quechua and Aymara peoples are the two major ethnic groups in Bolivia,
with Quechua people making up thirty percent of the population and Aymara people
totaling twenty-five percent. Id.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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88
spoke fluent Quechua, and his life story was much like theirs.'
Beginning in the 2002 elections, the MAS received the majority of the
indigenous votes, and the party's popularity among Indians has
1 89
increased since.
One important fact about Bolivia's election laws is that voting is
mandatory; workers cannot cash paychecks at banks without proof of
90
voting and can be subject to fines or imprisonment for not voting.1

Because voting is required by law, Bolivia has consistently had one of
the highest voter turnouts in the world, averaging over eighty percent
in the last sixty years. 191 This high voter turnout is significant because
it means that all segments of society vote in Bolivia's elections,
including the poor, rural, and uneducated citizens. Thus as Morales
was able to consolidate the indigenous majority behind his candidacy,
he was able to amass a great electoral advantage quickly, without
spending years working to get eligible voters to the polls; the poor,
rural citizens of Bolivia were already voting.

188. President Morales has referred to himself as "The Big Chief of the
Original Peoples." See EvoMorales.net, Evo Morales Aima, Big Chief of the
Original Peoples, http://www.evomorales.net/paginasEng/aDefaultEng.aspx (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009).
189. MADRID, supra note 157, at 13-14. Further, sixty-nine percent of MAS
voters reported growing up in a household where an indigenous language such as
Quechua or Aymara was spoken. Id. at 17.
190. RAFAEL LOPEZ PINTOR ET AL., INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND
ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, VOTER TURNOUT SINCE 1945: A GLOBAL REPORT 108
(2002),
http://www.idea.int/publications/vt/uploadNT_screenopt_2002.pdf
[hereinafter VOTER TURNOUT REPORT]. Observers of the historic vote in 2005 have
noted:
Voting in Bolivia is mandatory for citizens under 75. When you go vote,
you get three things. A pinkie, purple with indelible ink. An identity card,
which you have to show for the next month or so in any financial
transactions. And a commemorative pocket sized calendar from the
National Electoral Court. The calendar card features a picture of a red,
yellow and green tropical bird with its wings spread. A large pair of silver
scissors is poised open around one of the birds wings ready to chop it off.
In small print it reads, "A country without democracy is like a bird with
clipped wings."
Posting of Leise Gordon of the Democracy Center to Blog From Bolivia: Voting
Day in Bolivia-The Things We Saw, http://www.democracyctr.org/
blog/2005/12/voting-day-in-bolivia-things-we-saw.html (Dec. 18, 2005, 18:21 EST).
191. VOTER TURNOUT REPORT, supra note 190, at 81.
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b. Making Coca a BroaderIssue
In the 1990s, the coca growers' unions became a powerful
political force around the city of Cochabamba, where most of the
cultivation was taking place, but the unions were not as influential
throughout the rest of the country. 92 As U.S. intervention in Bolivia
increased, Morales was able to cast his party as the voice for common
people against Bolivia's elite and foreign interests who wished to
profit from Bolivia's resources. Dissatisfaction with U.S. and Bolivian
coca policy was gradually combined with a general anger over
globalization and what was perceived by Bolivians as U.S.
imperialism and expropriation of Bolivian national resources.
c. The Cochabamba "Water Wars" of 2000-2001
In 2001, one event combined the anti-U.S. sentiment that was
raging among coca growers with the anti-globalization movement in
Bolivia. The "Water Wars" in Cochabamba came about after a U.S.
engineering firm, Bechtel Corporation, entered into a contract with the
Bolivian government whereby a consortium led by Bechtel took over
the operation of the city's water system. 93 The privatization plan
initially resulted in drastic increases in water costs.1 94 The higher
costs, coupled with an ordinance prohibiting citizens from collecting
and using rainwater, prompted public outrage, protests, and riots that
95
eventually led to a declaration of martial law in Cochabamba.'
While the higher costs of water were almost certainly not the fault of
the privatization, poor Bolivians blamed the foreign companies,
especially the U.S. corporations, for their attempts to expropriate local
96
resources for profit. 1

192. MADRID, supra note 157, at 12. For example, in the 1999 municipal

elections in Bolivia, the MAS only received 2.4% of the vote outside of
Cochabamba. Id.
193. DANGL, supra note 16, at 57.
194. Id. at 58.
195. Id. at 59-64.
196. Id. at 62 ("[T]he general outrage was not just over the... price increases,
it had to do with the fact the increased fees were going to a giant, multinational
corporation and that many were forced to pay for a resource that had previously
come from Pachamama(Mother Earth) for free.").
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol39/iss2/2
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The anti-U.S. sentiment generated by the water crisis in
Cochabamba dovetailed perfectly with anti-U.S. rhetoric leveled by
Morales regarding drug policy. The water crisis fit into the growing
macro narrative that the United States was intent on raping Bolivia of
all its resources and controlling its domestic policy, and that the
corrupt Bolivian government was complicit. The Water Wars also
raised the profile of Morales and the cocaleros. Because the water
crisis took place in Cochabamba, the heart of the cocalero movement,
coca growers became involved in the protests, marching alongside
campesinos and other anti-globalization activists.1 97 The result of the
crisis was the marriage of anti-globalization activists with cocaleros
and the MAS.
d. The Natural Gas Protests of 2003
In 2003, Morales led another popular uprising, this time toppling a
president. 198 Bolivia possesses the largest natural gas reserves in South
America and some of the largest in the world. 199 Perhaps most
disappointing to Bolivia's poor has been the failure of the government
to convert natural gas wealth into a higher standard of living for the
majority of Bolivians.2 °° So when then-President Lozada, who was
almost defeated by Morales in 2002 and already disliked by the poor
for raising taxes, 20 1 proposed to build a pipeline to export Bolivia's
natural gas to neighboring Chile, peasants, led by Evo Morales, rioted
in La Paz.2 °2 They demanded that Bolivia's poor be given free natural
197. Benjamin Blackwell, From Coca to Congress: An Interview With Evo
Morales, ECOLOGIST, Nov. 11, 2002, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.
cfmItemlD=2612 (noting that "[m]any of the participants in the cocalero and
campesino organisations, Morales included, were schooled in this conflict. Their
campaign's strong anti-globalisation focus struck a chord among large sections of
the local population").
198. Bolivians Strike Against President, BBC NEWS, Feb. 17, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2772823. stm.
199. See Ming, supra note 132, at 376.
200. The Los Angeles Times has called Bolivia a "failed test case for freemarket policies because [the government has] done nothing to translate natural gas
riches into a better living standard for the vast majority of the population." Where
'Che' Left Off, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at B12.
201. See Johnson, supra note 20.
202. Bolivians Protest at Gas Plan, BBC NEWS, Oct. 1, 2003,
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gas before any of it was exported.2 °3 Morales provided the Lozada
Administration with a seventy-point list of demands and an
ultimatum: nationalize the gas industry or face massive resistance
throughout the country. 20 4 When Lozada refused, Morales called for
his resignation and led roadblocks in and around La Paz that crippled
the capital city. 20 5 Faced with the threat of massive violence, President
Lozada resigned on October 17, 2003, handing power to his Vice
President Carlos Mesa.20 6 Blaming the protesters for his loss of power,
Lozada called the protests acts of "sedition that on the pretext of
20 7
natural gas exports has violated the essence of democracy.,
Regardless of whether they were indeed seditious, the MAS
protests that ousted Lozada showed that Morales and the MAS had
succeeded in consolidating the cocaleros with other frustrated
segments of the population. While the protests were not about coca
rights, they were certainly motivated by the burgeoning movement
and anger over coca eradication. As Zurita-Vargas has written,
"[n]ews reports say that the riots have been over the construction of a
pipeline to ship natural gas to the United States. That's true, but
there's a deeper anger at work: anger toward the United States and its
war against a traditional Bolivian crop, coca., 20 8 The protests in La

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3153754.stm.
203. The proposal to export the gas through Chilean ports made the gas plan
even more controversial. There is longstanding animosity between Bolivians and
Chileans stemming from an 1879 war between the two nations, the result of which
left Bolivia landlocked without access to the Pacific coast. See MORALES, supra note
37, at 82-83.
204. BOLIVIA INFORMATION FORUM, BULLETIN No. 2, at 2, May 2006,
http://www.boliviainfoforum.org.uk/documents/114824583_BIF%2OBulletin%202.
pdf.
205. Bolivian President Quits Amid Turmoil, BBC NEWS, Oct. 18, 2003,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3202216. stm.
206. Id. Mesa would also be forced to resign by peasant protesters in 2005.
Mesa's replacement was the head of the Supreme Court, but because the new
president was outside of the constitutional line of succession, new elections were
mandatory. New Bolivia President Takes Over, BBC NEWS, June 10, 2005,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4075252. stm.
207. See Letter from Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, Constitutional President of
the
Republic
of
Bolivia
(Oct.
17,
2003),
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3202804.stm.
208. Zurita-Vargas, supra note 6.
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Paz demonstrated more clearly than ever that Morales and the
cocaleros had taken the mantle as leaders in the struggle against
foreign intervention and neoliberal economics-and had become the
dominant political force in the country. Clearly, to Morales and the
MAS, any U.S. ally, such as Lozada, and any policy that allowed
foreign governments or companies to control Bolivia's resources and
domestic policy would be unacceptable.
C. PresidentMorales
When Morales had his next opportunity to run for president, after
the resignation of Mesa in 2005, Morales' cocalero base was more
angry and better organized than ever. U.S. officials backed Morales'
opponent, and threatened to withdraw aid to Bolivia if Morales was
elected, yet this only made Morales more popular. 20 9 In December
2005, he was elected to a five-year term as president with over fifty
percent of the popular vote.2 10 At his inauguration in January 2006,
Morales, wearing a garland of coca around his neck, shouted "the
fight for coca symbolises our fight for freedom . . . .Coca growers
will continue to grow coca. There will never be zero coca.",2 11 In
response, the 20,000 cocaleros in attendance erupted with praise.2 12

209. Linda Farthing & Ben Kohl, Shock to the System; A Growing Indigenous
and People's Movement in Bolivia, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at 7.
[P]erhaps U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha gave Morales the biggest push
at the polls. In a highly publicized announcement just days before the
election, Rocha threatened to withdraw all U.S. aid if Morales became
president. Popular anger at this patent meddling in the country's
democratic process boosted Morales' support significantly: Bolivian
analysts estimate that the 'Rocha effect' contributed as much as 5 percent
to Morales' final tally. Since the election, the press has dryly referred to
Rocha as Morales' campaign manager.
Id.
210. Morales was elected with a majority 53.7% of the popular vote.
EvoMorales.net, Evo Morales Aima, Big Chief of the Original Peoples: Victory,
http://www.evomorales.netlpaginasEng/perfilEng-poder.aspx (last visited Mar. 6,
2009). The decisive victory was enough to avoid a runoff election to be decided by
the National Congress. Country Profile: Bolivia, supra note 9.
211. Steve Boggan, "Coca is a Way of Life," GUARDIAN, Feb. 9. 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/feb/09/features 11.g2.
212. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

In September 2006, President Morales spoke before the U.N.
General Assembly and asked the body to reverse a ban on the
international trade of products containing coca.2 13 As he addressed the
crowd, he held up a coca leaf, saying "It]his is the coca leaf, it is
green, not white like cocaine. '214 Morales was stressing his view that
it is illicitly processed cocaine, not coca leaves themselves, that should
be the target of international drug control policy. His view that coca
should not be destroyed just because it can be made into cocaine is
shared by a majority of Bolivia's population. This common
sentiment-that the United States should mind its own affairs and
leave Bolivia's sacred coca alone-resonated with indigenous
Bolivians and sustained Morales' rise from coca farmer, to union
leader, and ultimately to President of the Republic. The U.S. War on
Drugs provided the tinder that fueled the steady rise of Evo Morales
and his brand of socialism.
The White House could not have been happy that Morales' first
visit following his election was to see Fidel Castro in Havana, nor that
Venezuela's president and U.S. antagonist Hugo Chavez called
Morales "an emissary sent by God" at his inauguration. 215 Indeed, the
election of a socialist leader is inimical to the United States' stated
goals for Latin America, which include the development of stable
market democracies. The U.S. government never anticipated the
political consequences that would result from its intervention in
Bolivia's coca production because policymakers never understood
coca's role in Bolivia's culture nor did they understand that Bolivians
view coca as something entirely different from cocaine.
This Article has pointed out the obvious, but as of yet overlooked,
correlation between U.S. drug policy and the ascension of Evo
Morales and his socialist political party in Bolivia. Quite simply, but
for the U.S. War on Drugs, neither Morales nor his socialist political
party would hold power in Bolivia today.

213.

Caitlin Esch, CocaAdds Life to Bolivian Economy, BROOKLYN RAIL, June

2007, http://www.brooklynrail.org/20O7/6/express/coca.
214. Id.
215. Bolivia's Morales Set to Take Office, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 22, 2006,
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